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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of naturalization on the labor market outcomes of
foreign-born workers in France. Using a large panel dataset of workers employed in
France over 1993-2001, I ﬁnd that naturalization is associated with a sharp increase in
job mobility: immigrants tend to change occupations and employers, in the same year as
they naturalize. Turning to wages, I ﬁnd evidence that naturalization commands a wage
premium, which is associated with employment mobility. For workers initially in low-
skill occupations, the wage premium is conditional on occupational mobility. For those
in middle- or high-skilled occupations, there is also evidence of a wage premium, mostly
for foreign women; this premium is associated with moves to a diﬀerent ﬁrm. These
results suggest that foreign citizenship constrains workers mobility, and are consistent
with the hypothesis of a mismatch of foreign workers to their jobs.
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1 Introduction
Several recent studies in immigration countries have found that the acquisition of citizenship by
foreigners is associated with higher employment and wages (e.g. Bratsberg et al. (2002); Fougere
and Saﬁ (2009); Steinhardt (2012) for the US, France and Germany respectively). These studies
use longitudinal data, which allows to control, to some extent, for the selection of individuals into
naturalization; thus suggesting that naturalization by itself (rather than individual characteristics
of those who choose to naturalize), has, in these countries, a positive impact on the employment
prospects of immigrants, and on their wages.
Barriers on access to some jobs, facing foreign workers, are generally cited as the plausible
mechanism behind this pattern. Such barriers include legal restrictions - a number of jobs, mostly
in the public sector, being open only to nationals, in the US and in European countries. In addition
to this legal discrimination, foreign workers may also face discrimination by employers, for example
if citizenship is interpreted as a signal for (country-speciﬁc) human capital, or for a commitment
to stay longer in the country.
These various forms of discrimination may explain the observed employment impact of natural-
ization. They may also explain the positive wage eﬀect in two cases: if they apply in jobs paying
higher wages, for a given employee proﬁle; or, if they have an indirect impact on wages paid in
other, non-restricted positions, by lowering the probability of employment for non-citizens, and
thus weakening their bargaining position in the jobs which they have access to.
Alternatively, another source of explanation for the wage impact lies in the degree of economic
and legal security oﬀered by citizenship, through the assurance of legal stay and access to safety
nets. Without citizenship, obtaining and renewing a legal permit to stay may be tied to employ-
ment1. Consequently, foreign workers may be under more pressure to secure employment, and
thus have less time for screening positions; changing jobs may also be seen as a risk, if it implies
leaving a permanent contract for a short-term one or a testing period. In the presence of imper-
fect information on the labor market, this can create mismatch between foreign workers and the
positions they occupy. In this case, the wage gap is not caused by discrimination in speciﬁc jobs,
but rather by a broader form of discrimination on the labor market.
This paper contributes to clarify these mechanisms in the French case. A large, administrative
dataset of employer data is used, where immigrant and native workers are followed throughout their
professional life.2 The longitudinal (annual) dimension of the data allows to control for individual
1This is the case in France (see below)
2The DADS (Déclaration annuelle des données sociales) comprises all data reported by employers in France
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heterogeneity when measuring the impacts that naturalization has on the careers of immigrants
- i.e. on the wages they earn and the types of jobs they hold. I put speciﬁc attention to the
conjunction between these two impacts, looking at whether the naturalization wage premium is
tied to a change of employer or occupation.3
Results show, ﬁrst, that naturalization triggers a sharp increase in job mobility: the probability
of changing employer, as well as occupation, increases sharply in the year of naturalization. Table 1
illustrates this point. The probabilities of changing employer, occupation, as well as location, labor
contract, or entering the public sector, are computed for all individuals in the sample (including
foreigners and naturalized foreign-born), depending on whether they are foreigner, naturalized, or
just in the year of naturalization. All these probabilities increase sharply in the precise year of
naturalization, a result which will be conﬁrmed later when controlling for a range of individual
characteristics.
Second, my results conﬁrm the presence of a naturalization wage premium in the French
context, but highlight the importance of accounting for heterogeneity in this relationship. For
foreign men, the premium exists mostly for workers initially employed in low-skilled occupations;
while among women, by contrast, there is evidence of a premium for those in middle- and high-
skilled occupations.
Third, results establish a link between the wage premium and job mobility. For workers em-
ployed in low-skill occupations in particular, the premium materializes only for those changing
occupation in the year of their naturalization: thus naturalization increases wages because it al-
lows to move to a better paid type of job. This suggests a pattern of mismatch (between employee
and job), prior to naturalization. The mobility eﬀect is centered on the naturalization year, thus
there is no apparent reason (such as skill) why those workers would not have been able to change
before; other than the constraint that foreign citizenship exerts on mobility itself. 4 One possible
explanation lies in the precarious situation of those with foreign citizenship, due to uncertainty
about legal stay and safety nets; this may lead some foreigners to accept jobs not matching their
qualiﬁcations, because they have not the time to search further (or because changing job is risky,
if it involves a testing period during which long-term employment is not guaranteed).
The link between mobility and the wage premium also appears to hold in the case of women in
about their employees for computation of social contributions. The panel dataset used here follows over time all
workers born in October of even years. In most of the empirical analysis I use data for the period 1993-2001, for
reasons detailed below.
3As individuals born in France to foreign parents become French at 18, very few such cases are considered here
(less than 0.5% observations at age under 18). This study is thus essentially about naturalizations of workers born
abroad, i.e. about ﬁrst-generation, not second-generation immigrants.
4In addition, I also conduct robustness checks to verify that the wage premium is not taking place in the years
preceding naturalization.
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middle- and higher-skilled occupations.5 In this case, the eﬀect on wages is found for those workers
who change employer (while staying in the same occupation category).
This eﬀect can also be explained by the fact that those workers accept less paying positions
because they lack time or security to search for a better match. Alternatively, it could be that
citizenship is lifting barriers to speciﬁc positions. Restrictions on access to speciﬁc professions and
public sector jobs, passport requirements for some positions, employer preferences, are among the
forms of discrimination (legal or not) that could play a role. The fact that this eﬀect is speciﬁc to
foreign women suggests that two forms of discriminations, based on gender and nationality, may
be interacting here.
The analysis on wages is conducted while controlling for individual heterogeneity using an
individual ﬁxed-eﬀects model. Thus, the wage increase is not explained by constant individual
characteristics associated to the choice to naturalize. However, there remains the possibility that
those who eventually naturalize have distinctive wage patterns, for example because they invest
more in country-speciﬁc human or social capital, in prevision of staying long-term in the country (or
to increase their chances of obtaining citizenship). I control for this in several ways. First, I check
that both the mobility and the wage eﬀects of naturalization occur at the time of naturalization,
and not in the years before. Second, I use speciﬁcations allowing for individual wage growth to
diﬀer for those who eventually naturalize (or, also, for those in particular who change jobs when
naturalizing). These tests conﬁrm that the observed wage impacts are not detected in any form
(level or growth) before citizenship acquisition. This establishes that naturalization is instrumental
in the eﬀects on job mobility and wages I measure, and that these eﬀects are not driven by selection
into naturalization. 6
5Classiﬁcation of occupation is based on the original categories socio-professionnelles available in the data, and is
described in detail in the data section. Medium- and high-skilled occupations referred to here include intermediary
oﬃce workers , technical workers, managers and executives.
6Note however, that the eﬀects measured could still be speciﬁc to those applying for citizenship, or to those
whose demand is accepted. I cannot estimate how much the measured eﬀect could be extended if, for instance,
naturalization was made easier.
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Table 1: Mobility rates: changing employer, contract type, location
Status Foreigner Naturalization Citizen
Changing employer
Staying with same employer 113,632 3,668 20,707
Changing employer 27,208 2,959 4,631
P[changing](%) 19.3 44.6 18.3
Changing occupation (1-digit)
Same occ. 128,709 5,113 22,311
Changed occ. 10,842 1,347 2,634
P[changing] (%) 7.8 20.9 10.6
Changing location (département)
Same dept 128,280 5,206 23,258
Changed dept. 12,536 1,418 2,077
P[changing] (%) 8.9 21.4 8.2
Changing sector of employment
Same sector 119,723 4,210 21,558
changing 21,015 2,413 3,761
P[changing](%) 14.9 36.4 14.8
Entering public sector
No 139,981 6,476 25,138
Yes 479 127 161
P[enter](%) 0.3 1.9 0.6
Changing labor contract (2006-2008)
Same contract 112,238 10,394 39,186
changing contract 20,478 3,461 3,386
P[changing](%) 15.43 25.0 7.9
Source: panel DADS, 1993-2001, except last panel: 2006-2008. Sample includes
all foreigners and naturalized individuals, for all individuals being observed two
consecutive years; changes are from one year to the next.
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Early socio-economic studies of naturalization have studied the determinants, rather than the
consequences, of it. Rates of naturalization were found to vary widely across origins, education and
cultural backgrounds. Acquisition of the host country citizenship is a choice, which an economist
would want to explain by the prospective beneﬁts a candidate can expect from it. However, the
decision is not primarily an economic one, and could instead be motivated by political factors,
symbolic ones. Bernard (1936)'s ﬁndings, of higher naturalization among the high educated,
suggests that it could be used as a signal of status, and of willingness to stay, rather than as an
instrument for economic progress. Portes and Curtis (1987) show that naturalization rates are
especially low among Mexican immigrants, and show this to be explained by the short distance
from origin, and by the temporary nature of the immigrant experience for the majority of them.
Diehl and Blohm (2003) ﬁnd that, among Turkish immigrants in Germany, the propensity to
naturalize is higher among those most assimilated (those with German friends, speaking German,
Turkish immigrants). Thus, they argue that naturalization is used at the end of the assimilation
process, to bring legal status in accordance with a social status already achieved.
One early study of the economic eﬀects of naturalization was Chiswick (1978), who was inter-
ested in the process of assimilation of immigrants. He found evidence of naturalized immigrants
having higher wages, but this result obtained in cross-sectional estimation does not establish causal-
ity; thus, it does not say whether naturalization is only a sign of assimilation, or as an essential
component of it.
More recently, several studies have used longitudinal data to test the hypothesis of natural-
ization having a direct impact on labor market outcomes. Comparing cross-sectional and panel
estimates has allowed to ask whether there was more than selection in the naturalization eﬀect, as
well as to infer the direction of selection. 7
Most studies answer positively. Bratsberg et al. (2002); Steinhardt (2012) ﬁnd a positive impact
on wages, in the US and Germany, respectively. Bevelander and Pendakur (2012) ﬁnd a positive
impact on employment in Sweden. By contrast, Scott (2008) and Engdahl (2011) ﬁnd little or no
wage premium of naturalization in the case of Sweden, after controlling for individual heterogeneity.
Bratsberg and Raaum (2011) ﬁnds no positive impact on wages, in the case of Norway, and a small
negative impact for some groups. Fougere and Saﬁ (2009) found a positive employment eﬀect in
the case of France.
Bratsberg et al. (2002) use a small sample from a longitudinal survey, the NLSY, focused
7Panel estimates with ﬁxed eﬀects allow to control for constant, unobserved individual characteristics inﬂuencing
both the probability to naturalize and labor market outcomes. However, another possible source of bias lies in the
fact that naturalization reﬂects a longer-term commitment to stay in the host country, so that those willing to
naturalize may be accumulating more country-speciﬁc human capital, even before naturalization. This can result
in higher wage growth for them. This is discussed in section 3.5 below.
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on Youth in the US (along with CPS data used in cross-section). Steinhardt (2012) is using
administrative data, similar to those used here, for Germany. Both are using the panel dimension to
control for individual characteristics entering into the self-selection of candidates for naturalization.
The evidence in this paper of a wage premium of naturalization is broadly in line with their
results. However, the present paper shows the premium to be signiﬁcant only for some speciﬁc
occupation groups, and to be conditional on employment mobility patterns; by contrast, these
two studies do not explicitly test for such heterogeneity. Therefore, the comparison raises the
possibility that their estimates reﬂect an average of diﬀerent premia across heterogeneous groups.
Bratsberg et al. (2002) also ﬁnd, in cross-sectional data, that the probability of holding a
public-sector job, a white-collar one, or a unionized one, is higher for naturalized immigrants.
They interpret this as evidence that the wage premium results from access to those job categories,
with citizenship lifting speciﬁc barriers to better-paid positions. The present paper tests this hy-
pothesis, and conﬁrms it only partly. It establishes the link between the wage premium and job
mobility. Mobility across occupations is one of important channels; on the contrary, access to
public sector does not seem to play a major role.
The next section presents some background on French naturalization laws. Section 3 discusses
the data and the empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results. The last section
concludes.
2 Naturalization and the labor market: the French context
Acquisitions of French citizenship averaged 125,000 per year over 1995-2001, and 133,000 since
then.8 These include naturalizations by decree (by administrative decision upon request by the
foreigner), or by declaration, which applies to spouses of a French person, and to children born
in France of foreign parents (jus soli).9 Naturalizations by decree account for about 50% of cases
over the period considered.
Conditions for eligibility to naturalization include 5 years of prior residence in France, legal
status (at the time of the request), no criminal record, secured income, as well as social, profes-
sional and cultural assimilation (Art. 21 of the Code Civil). Note that acceptance depends on
8Ministry of Interior.
9The data do not allow to distinguish between these cases; I only observe changes in nationality as reported by
an individual's employer, and refer to all such occurrences as naturalizations, after cleaning of the data as detailed
below. Note however that children born in France obtain citizenship by declaration when reaching age 18, thus
most of these cases are excluded of the analysis as I use data for employed people, mostly older: people between 16
and 18 account for less than 0.5% of the estimation sample.
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a discretionary decision by the administration, and can be refused even if these requirements are
fulﬁlled. In particular, the criteria of cultural assimilation and of professional integration (insertion
professionnelle) are to be appreciated by the prefet. For example, the nature of employment or of
the labor contract do not explicitly enter the legal requirements; however, short-term or low-pay
contracts can be a motive for rejection.10
The process of naturalization can be long. The oﬃcial maximum delay is of 18 months after
the request is received. However, delays to submit the request may also add some time. Hagedorn
(2001) indicates that the waiting time for the applicants amounted in 1997 to seven months for an
initial meeting with a staﬀ member and additional eight months to have the obligatory interview in
which assimilation potential and personal motivation is examined. In addition, informal sources,
such as associations, indicate that several applications are often necessary before obtaining a
positive result.11
Fougere and Saﬁ (2009) note that the average length of sojourn in France prior to naturaliza-
tion is approximately 17 years, much longer than in Canada or the US. The rate of naturalized
foreign-born was 75% in the 1996 Canadian census, compared to 40% in France.
As is the case in other immigration countries, a number of jobs are restricted to nationals,
mostly in the public sector. 12 A report from the Haut Conseil à l'Intégration indicated in 1998
that the stock of jobs available to non-European foreigners is reduced by 23% (Haut conseil à
l'Intégration, 1998). Groupe d'Etude sur les Discriminations (2000) ﬁnds a ﬁgure of 30%, showing
that, in addition to public servant positions being restricted to nationals (or EU nationals), suc-
cessive legislation has created restrictions in numerous private sector professions.13 These include
physicians and surgeons, pharmacists, notaries, architects, insurance oﬃcers, managers of a private
research laboratory, or of a ﬁrm in the funerals, explosives, or fund escorting.14
However, as underlined by Haut conseil à l'Intégration (1998), the diﬀerence in labor market
10This is indicated by associations providing advice to immigrants, such as www.info-droits-etrangers.org/.
11Oﬃcial ﬁgures on rates of refusal are not made public.
12Employment restrictions to non-citizens apply in e.g. Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, the US and Sweden.
See Kogan, 2003; Corluy et al., 2011; DeVoretz and Pivnenko, 2005; Euwals et al., 2010; Steinhardt, 2012; Bevelander
and Veenman, 2006; Scott, 2008.
13Such legislation has accumulated since the late 19th century, with numerous laws targeting speciﬁc profes-
sions, motivated partly by concerns regarding national sovereignty and security (weapons trade), xenophobia, and
corporatist lobbying.
In the public sector, non-EU nationals generally are denied access to titulaire positions (permanent contracts for
public servants), but not to contract jobs (status similar to private sector employment). This also applies to public
ﬁrms such as the national railroads, energy, and air ﬂight companies.
14By contrast, in the US, most similar restrictions for private sector professions have been repealed, according to
Yang (1994)
8
outcomes (in particular unemployment) between foreigners and nationals cannot be explained
entirely by legal discrimination. Several studies have brought evidence of discrimination at hiring
against immigrants: see e.g. Cediey and Foroni (2007).
In addition, labor market outcomes may diﬀer for non-nationals due to diﬀerences in exit
options. Even though, as acknowledged by Haut conseil à l'Intégration (1998), discrimination
in access to welfare beneﬁts have been essentially removed, some minor diﬀerences subsist. For
example, access to the minimum income allocation (RMI, now RSA) is conditional, for foreigners
without resident status, on having spent at least 3 years in the country (Math, 2011). 15 Haut
conseil à l'Intégration (1998) also points out that delays in registering individuals or in the renewal
of permits to stay may disrupt access to beneﬁts.
Another factor is the link between employment and residency permits. Tow main types of
permit exist for non-EU nationals in France. The ﬁrst if the residence status which guarantees
authorization to stay for ten years, and may be requested after 5 years of legal stay in the territory;
the second is a temporary one-year card which needs to be renewed every year upon examination
of the individual's situation. For non-students, stable employment is one of the conditions for
renewal (as well as for obtention of residency card).
In accordance with citizenship opening wider employment opportunities, Fougere and Saﬁ
(2009) ﬁnd higher employment probabilities for naturalized immigrants. 16
3 Data and Methodology
The main dataset I use is the panel from the Déclaration annuelle des données sociales (DADS).
The DADS dataset is a large administrative dataset of matched employer-employee information
collected by the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE). These
data are based upon mandatory employer reports of earnings of each employee subject to French
payroll taxes. Thus, they comprise all legally declared employees in French establishments. Among
these, the INSEE builds a panel dataset with a randomly selected 1/12th of workers, which can
be followed in time. I use this panel dataset in this paper.
15This duration was brought to 5 years in 2004.
16This is consistent with studies in other European countries, e.g. Bevelander and Veenman (2006); Bevelander
and Pendakur (2012).
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3.1 Deﬁnition of Immigrants
For each individual, the dataset records personal characteristics - gender, age, year of entry in
the labor force - job characteristics, including occupation type, net annual earnings, and the
employer, including the location, industry and size of the employing establishment. The panel
covers the period 1993-2008. However, the nationality variable, allowing us to identify immigrants
and naturalization events, is not recorded in the years 2002 to 2005. In order to have a continuous
sample of years, I therefore restrict the analysis to the period 1993-2001. The only exception will
concern the study on the eﬀect of naturalization on changes in job contracts (short-term, long-term
and temporary contracts), as this variable is only recorded after 2005.
Recorded in the data is the French or foreign nationality of each employee.17 I focus on workers
recorded as foreign at some point in the data, i.e. foreign and naturalized individuals.
Note that in France, jus soli implies that individuals born of foreign parents in France can
acquire French nationality, by right, at 18. Thus, I consider very few such cases, as I focus on
working individuals, (less than 0.5% of observations under 18). This study is thus essentially about
ﬁrst-generation immigrants.
One issue with this variable is that it is not always well recorded by employers, as it is an
information required in the forms but not relevant for the computation of employer contributions.
The presence of inconsistencies in the panel dataset  e.g., people recorded as switching from
foreigner to national several times  is a sign of measurement error. This is particularly an issue
for the identiﬁcation of naturalization events.
I address this issue by eliminating all series of the variable nationality which seem suspicious:
whenever an individual is observed switching from French to foreigner, I get rid of the data
series for this individual. Although there may be occurrences of individuals changing nationality
in this direction, I expect that a number of these cases are due either to misrecording (i.e., an
individual incorrectly recorded as French, then later correctly as foreign), or to individuals having
double nationalities, and being recorded alternatively as one or the other. This also eliminates all
cases of multiple switching.18
An additional issue with this variable is that I do not observe individuals with the nationality
of a European union (EU) member country. This is an issue as one expects an EU nationality to
entail much less constraints on the labor market as a non-EU one.19 My approach is the following.
17Note that this variable does not allow to identify immigrants in the commonly admitted deﬁnition of the term,
i.e. a person born abroad as a foreigner.
18In the regressions of table 1, where the indicator variable for the naturalization year is used, observations with
an ambiguity for citizenship in the year t+ 1 are also eliminated.
19First, EU nationals do not face any restriction to stay and work in France, and are not required to hold a
permit. Second, a number of professions are open to EU country nationals.
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Information on EU nationality is actually recorded in the most recent years of the data, after
2005, which I am not using for the analysis (I focus on the 1993-2001 period, oﬀering a longer time
horizon). Therefore, in the 1993-2001 data I use, I get rid of individuals observed later - after 2005
- as EU nationals.20
Finally, the dataset is formed of individuals who have been recorded as foreigners at some point
in the data. This is because I am mainly interested in observing the impact of naturalization in
time: therefore, I compare workers who naturalize with those who remain non-citizens.
3.2 Occupation variables
I consider four main categories of occupation:21 Blue-collar low-skilled workers, i.e. manual occupa-
tions; White-collar low-skilled workers, including commercial employees, personal service workers,
oﬃce employees in public and private sector. Middle-skilled professions; including intermediary of-
ﬁce workers in private and public sectors, technical workers, foremen; and high-skilled professions,
including lawyers, health, professionals, public sector managing personnel, scientists, engineers and
technical managers.22
In some results, I will also make use of the ﬁner classiﬁcation of occupations (2-digit CSP
code) provided in the data. For example, the blue-collar low-skilled category breaks down into
qualiﬁed/non-qualiﬁed workers in industrial/craftmanship sector; drivers; transportation workers;
and agricultural workers.
3.3 Main employment
The DADS data contains information on every (legal) employment for each worker. Many workers
thus appear to have several positions in a given year, either because they changed employment
during the year, or because they held several positions simultaneously. In the empirical analysis I
retain only one position per worker and year, denoted the worker's main employment. This position
20In average, 60% of individuals present in the data over 1993-2001 are still being observed after 2005.
21These are based on the 1-digit classiﬁcation of catégories socio-professionnelles deﬁned by the INSEE and pro-
vided in the data. See http://www.insee.fr/fr/methodes/default.asp?page=nomenclatures/pcs2003/pcs2003.htm
for details.
The category of managers and CEOs will not be considered. It represents less than 2% of the observations in the
sample of immigrants used here.
22Caliendo et al. (2012) use the same dataset, and argue that this classiﬁcation of occupations is hierarchical, in
the sense that wage distributions are ranked, and that numbers of workers per layer in a ﬁrm decrease when going
up. Their category clerks is called white-collar low-skilled here, supervisors are my middle-skilled and senior
staﬀ my high-skilled.
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is the one with the most recorded worked days in the year; if there are several such positions, I
select the one with most hours; and ﬁnally, the one with highest pay, if there still remain several
candidates.23
3.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 documents the distribution of the main variables of interest and controls, for the sample of
foreign-born workers. Note that low-skilled occupations represent the large majority of positions
held by foreign-born workers. For comparison, the lower panel displays the distribution of occu-
pations among native workers, (i.e. excluding foreigners and naturalized individuals), this data
being used in the last section of the empirical exercise. Shares of natives employed in low-skilled
blue-collar positions are much lower than among foreign-born, in particular for women.
23I also eliminate observations with less than 50 or more than 2500 hours worked per year. The maximum of
2500 hours is a correction applied by INSEE.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Foreign-born Men Women
Mean SD Mean SD
Age 40.9 11.2 39.1 11.3
Experience 11.8 8.2 8.9 7.7
Tenure 4.9 6.7 3.7 5.2
Occupation categories Men Women
N % N %
High-skilled 13,831 9.5 5,512 7.5
Medium-skilled 15,229 10.4 9,128 12.5
Low-skilled white-collar 20,680 14.1 30,662 41.8
Low-skilled blue-collar 93,856 64.2 27,558 37.6
CEOs 2,629 1.8 447 0.6
Total 146,225 100 73,307 100
Natives Men Women
N % N %
High-skilled 281,838 12.5 138,051 7.2
Medium-skilled 467,086 20.7 449,412 23.4
Low-skilled white-collar 365,136 16.2 1,039,525 54
Low-skilled blue-collar 1,106,908 49.1 288,065 14.9
CEOs 32,913 1.5 8,846 0.5
Total 2,253,881 100 1,923,899 100
Sample includes data for 1993-2001. Main employment observa-
tions. Foreign-born denotes workers recorded at least once as for-
eign in the data. Note: observations for CEOs are not used in the
empirical analysis.
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3.5 The Empirical Methodology
Naturalization and mobility I ﬁrst investigate the link between naturalization and mobility
- i.e., the propensity to change occupation, employer, location, or sector. Table 1 suggests that
such a link exists. I test whether this link still holds when controlling for worker characteristics,
by ﬁtting the following logit model by maximum likelihood :
P [mobilityit] = F (α.Foreignit + γ.Natit + β.Xit + δt), (1)
where F (z) = e
z
1+ez
is the cumulative logistic distribution. P [mobilityit] is the probability that
individual i changes occupation, employer, location... between year t and t+ 1.24 Foreignit is an
indicator of foreign citizenship, and Natit equals 1 in the year of naturalization. Thus the model
estimates whether the propensity to change is diﬀerent in the year an individual acquires French
citizenship, relative to the mobility level of naturalized workers. Xit denotes a set of controls, which
will include age and age squared, and indicator variables for the region (of work), occupational
category, and sector of employment. δt denotes year ﬁxed-eﬀects, to control for the time shocks to
employment mobility. In addition, I also include variables Nati,t−1 and Nati,t+1 as regressors in
order to test whether the eﬀect is also observed one year before/after naturalization.
Naturalization and wages To capture the eﬀect of citizenship acquisition on annual wages, I
use a baseline wage equation of the type:
lnwit = α.CTZit + β.Xit + δt + δi + ξit , (2)
with wit the hourly wage of worker i in her main employed position in year t. CTZit is a binary
indicator of French citizenship.25 Thus, coeﬃcient α measures the average diﬀerence between post-
and pre-naturalization log wages for a given worker, controlling for individual characteristics and
the variables in Xit. Xit is a vector of controls, which include experience (number of years since
ﬁrst entry in the labor force in France), tenure (number of years spent in the same ﬁrm), and their
squares. δt denote year ﬁxed eﬀects. δi is the individual time-invariant component of the error
term, and ξit an idiosyncratic disturbance.
24The alternative is no change between t and t+1: individuals whose occupation, employer or location is missing
in t+ 1 are removed from the estimation sample.
25Data cleaning procedures, detailed in section 3, imply that a change in CTZit can occur at most one time per
individual, and always from 0 to 1.
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Identiﬁcation of α in this equation relies on the assumption that the acquisition of French citi-
zenship is correlated with constant individual characteristics, but not with time-varying, individual
unobserved determinants of wages. This may not be true if, for example, naturalized workers have
a diﬀerent pattern of human capital accumulation. One would then expect to measure a diﬀerent
time trend for wages of naturalized workers, even before naturalization takes place. This concern
will be addressed in the robustness checks section, in particular by adding to the above model
interactions between experience and indicator variables for workers who eventually naturalize.
Results show that the wage eﬀects of naturalization vary across occupation groups. For this
reason, the model will be estimated separately by occupation, grouping workers by their initial
occupation in the data.26
Next, I will decompose the impact of naturalization, by distinguishing cases where citizenship
acquisition is accompanied by mobility, i.e. a change of occupation and/or of employer. This is
done with the following speciﬁcation:
lnwit = α
mob.CTZit.D
mob
i + α
nomob.CTZit.D
nomob
i + β.Xit + δt + δi + ξit , (3)
where Dmobi and D
nomob
i are indicator variables of value 1 if individual i naturalized and changed
occupation in the same year (Dmobi ), or naturalized but without occupational change (D
nomob
i ).
One has CTZit.D
mob
i + CTZit.D
nomob
i = CTZit for all individuals i in the sample.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 The Impact of Naturalization on Mobility
First, I document the fact that naturalization coincides, for many individuals, with mobility along
several dimensions: the probability of moving to a diﬀerent employer and type of job (occupation),
as well as changing contract type, and location, is much higher in the year of naturalization, than
at any other time.
In table 3, I use the speciﬁcation shown in equation 1 to test for the link between naturalization
and mobility, which was suggested in table 1. Results conﬁrm that the mobility of immigrant
workers is higher in the year of naturalization. For example, the odds of changing occupation are
multiplied by 2.9 for foreign men in the year of naturalization.
26Alternatively one may estimate a model with all workers and interaction terms to allow for diﬀerent impacts.
The method here is preferred as it allows for the impact of control variables, e.g. experience and tenure, to also
vary across occupations.
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The probability to move to a diﬀerent ﬁrm, occupation, or sector, increases in the same year
that naturalization occurs; the eﬀects on year earlier or later are much smaller or non signiﬁcant.
This is consistent with naturalization facilitating mobility, rather than the other way around. If,
for example, employment changes were decided to increase one's chance of obtaining citizenship,
then we should expect to ﬁnd most of the mobility eﬀect appear on the Naturalization t − 1
variable.
More generally, one could think that citizenship acquisition is a decision which is part of a
broader change undertaken by an individual, possibly involving a change of job, location, etc. But
if this were solely the result of an individual decision, then there would be no reason to wait for
the naturalization to occur before these other changes. One would then expect to ﬁnd job mobility
preceding naturalization, especially given the delay between the ﬁrst demand and obtention of
the nationality, which in France is often of two years or more. Instead, these results suggest that
obtaining the nationality is what makes professional mobility possible.
The eﬀect is not due to a correlation with age, which the model controls for. Nor is it ex-
plained by the fact that those naturalizing have particular types of occupation, location, or sector
employment, which would be associated with higher mobility: including indicator variables for
year, region, sector and occupation in these regressions rules out this possibility.
Next, I look at this mobility eﬀect across occupation groups. As we have just seen that
occupation changes, in particular, were higher when naturalizing, a natural question is whether
this eﬀect concerns foreign workers in all occupation groups, and in which direction these changes
occurs.
In table 4, I split the sample into groups by occupation, i.e. the initial occupation of each
foreign worker in the sample, and estimates the probability of moving to a diﬀerent occupation.
The naturalization eﬀect on mobility is detected in all groups (except for women in high-skill
occupations). However, one notes that this eﬀect is stronger in the low-skilled than the high-
skilled occupations. For instance, the odds of changing occupation are multiplied by more than 3
in the year of naturalization, for foreign men in low-skilled blue-collar jobs; for those in high-skilled
positions, the factor is less than 2.
Finally, in table 5, I look at employer mobility across occupation groups. The pattern found
here is the opposite: mobility is signiﬁcantly higher at naturalization, for all groups of workers
(except women in low-skilled blue-collar occupations); but the eﬀect tends to increase when moving
up the skill level of jobs. The employer mobility eﬀect is larger for workers initially in middle- and
high-skilled occupation groups, than for those in low-skilled ones.
Taken together, these results suggest that the incidence of foreign citizenship on employment
16
is present across occupation classes. Results on occupational mobility are consistent with skill
mismatch, by some foreign workers are constrained to take jobs below their qualiﬁcation. But
workers in higher-skill jobs also seem to face some type of mismatch, as naturalization creates an
opportunity to move to diﬀerent jobs.
Whether these two types of mobility are associated with a wage increase is the question we
turn to in the next section.
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Table 3: Naturalization and mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probability of changing
employer occupation location sector
Panel A: Men
Naturalization 2.60 2.89 2.56 2.68
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Naturalization: T-1 1.39 1.80 1.36 1.42
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Naturalization: T+1 1.14 0.99 1.29 1.13
(0.05) (0.87) (0.01) (0.14)
Foreign 1.42 0.70 1.30 1.09
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10)
Baseline odds .18 .05 .07 .08
Observations 64093 63808 64090 61672
Pseudo R2 0.059 0.061 0.078 0.057
Panel B: Women
Naturalization 2.71 2.44 2.33 2.77
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Naturalization: T-1 1.12 1.27 1.08 1.26
(0.13) (0.01) (0.46) (0.01)
Naturalization: T+1 1.35 1.01 1.46 1.23
(0.00) (0.96) (0.00) (0.04)
Foreign 1.50 1.03 1.60 1.17
(0.00) (0.64) (0.00) (0.01)
Baseline odds 0.21 0.09 0.09 0.10
Observations 28666 28447 28636 27639
Pseudo R2 0.052 0.036 0.066 0.051
Fixed eﬀects Year,region
Exponentiated coeﬃcients. Standard errors in parentheses
c p<0.1, b p<0.05, a p<0.01
Logit model on probability of mobility between year t and t+1, table displays odds
ratios. Sample: DADS data, foreign-born workers, 1993-2001. Baseline odds are
computed as the median predicted value (pˆ/(1− pˆ)) among foreign, non naturalizing
workers. Model includes age, age squared as controls. Observations with missing
information on employment in the following year are dropped from the sample.
Naturalization equals 1 in t for a worker who is foreign in t and French in t+1. 1-digit
occupation has four categories: High-skilled, middle-skilled, low-skilled white/blue-
collar. Location: région of employment. Sector: NES classiﬁcation. See section 3
for details on occupational categories. 18
Table 4: Occupational mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probability of changing occupation
Occupation LS blue collar LS white collar Med-skill High-Skill
Men
Naturalization 3.13 2.27 2.21 1.86
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Naturalization: T-1 1.89 1.50 1.53 0.95
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.84)
Naturalization: T+1 0.96 1.25 0.92 0.97
(0.78) (0.23) (0.64) (0.92)
Foreign 0.59 1.23 1.01 1.05
(0.00) (0.08) (0.95) (0.77)
Baseline odds 0.03 0.16 0.12 0.08
Observations 44157 7889 6277 5389
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.041 0.035 0.026
Fixed eﬀects Year,region
Women
Naturalization 3.50 2.03 2.10 1.41
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.29)
Naturalization: T-1 1.71 1.06 1.17 0.53
(0.00) (0.69) (0.49) (0.24)
Naturalization: T+1 0.87 1.10 1.00 0.74
(0.55) (0.54) (1.00) (0.55)
Foreign 0.92 1.22 1.06 1.12
(0.52) (0.03) (0.72) (0.65)
Baseline odds 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.09
Observations 11537 12101 3102 1672
Pseudo R2 0.065 0.030 0.034 0.045
Fixed eﬀects Year,region
Exponentiated coeﬃcients. p-values in parentheses
Logit model on probability of changing occupation (1-digit csp category) between year t and
t+1, table displays odds ratios. Sample: DADS, foreign-born workers, 1993-2001. Baseline
odds are computed as the median predicted value (pˆ/(1−pˆ)) among foreign, non naturalizing
workers. Model includes age, age squared as controls. Sample in each column includes all
foreign workers ﬁrst observed in a given occupation, e.g. low-skilled blue-collar for column
1. Workers are classiﬁed by ﬁrst observed occupation category. Variable deﬁnitions as in
table 3.
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Table 5: Employer mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probability of changing employer
Occupation LS blue collar LS white collar Med-skill High-Skill
Men
Naturalization 1.60 1.41 2.61 2.03
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Naturalization: T-1 1.06 1.18 1.44 1.80
(0.51) (0.42) (0.10) (0.01)
Naturalization: T+1 1.32 0.69 1.04 0.73
(0.02) (0.15) (0.85) (0.23)
Foreign 1.58 1.14 0.81 0.68
(0.00) (0.33) (0.13) (0.01)
Baseline odds 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.08
Observations 44357 7958 6247 5455
Pseudo R2 0.021 0.024 0.027 0.033
Women
Naturalization 1.19 1.84 1.70 3.21
(0.13) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Naturalization: T-1 0.81 0.85 1.41 1.51
(0.23) (0.32) (0.22) (0.37)
Naturalization: T+1 1.32 1.37 1.44 1.01
(0.21) (0.05) (0.22) (0.98)
Foreign 2.22 1.20 1.18 0.59
(0.00) (0.08) (0.43) (0.04)
Observations 11624 12197 3065 1640
Pseudo R2 0.025 0.034 0.049 0.060
Baseline odds 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.08
Fixed eﬀects Year,region
Exponentiated coeﬃcients. p-values in parentheses
Logit model on probability of changing occupation (1-digit csp category) between year t and
t+1, table displays odds ratios. Sample: foreign-born workers, 1993-2001. Baseline odds
are computed as the median predicted value (pˆ/(1 − pˆ)) among foreign, non naturalizing
workers. Model includes age, age squared as controls. Sample in each column includes all
foreign workers ﬁrst observed in a given occupation, e.g. low-skilled blue-collar for column
1. Workers are classiﬁed by ﬁrst observed occupation category. Variable deﬁnitions as in
table 3.
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4.2 The Impact of Naturalization on Wages
I now look at the relationship between citizenship and wages. I ask whether a wage gain from
naturalization appears in France, as is the case in several countries studied in previous studies. I
also want to ask whether this potential wage gain is linked to the mobility patterns - changes of
occupation, of ﬁrm - identiﬁed in the previous section. To this purpose, I use panel regressions
with individual ﬁxed-eﬀects, on the sample of foreign-born workers in France; the model used is
the one described in equation 2.
Results in line 1 of tables 6 and 7 show that the overall eﬀect of naturalizations (citizenship)
on wages is limited: the only signiﬁcant impact is found for women initially in middle-skilled
occupations.
In the lower parts of the tables, I then decompose the citizenship variable according to the
mobility pattern at the time of naturalization, using the model of equation (3). This allows to
measure diﬀerent eﬀects of citizenship depending on the mobility behavior in the year of natural-
ization. I distinguish up to three cases: occupation change, same occupation but employer change,
and same occupation and employer.
This reveals the presence of wage gains conditional on some speciﬁc mobility patterns. Namely,
there is a signiﬁcant citizenship premium, of about 8%, for men in low-skill white-collar occu-
pations, when naturalization coincides with occupational mobility. Note that this eﬀect does not
hold when including occupation ﬁxed-eﬀects, indicating that the wage increase is entirely explained
by average pay diﬀerences between occupation classes. In addition, there is indication of a wage
gain for men in high-skill occupations, of about 4%, under the condition of no occupation, and no
employer mobility at the time of naturalization.
In the case of women, the decomposition also reveals the presence of a wage premium conditional
on some mobility patterns. Women in middle-skilled occupations beneﬁt from a naturalization
premium when they move to a diﬀerent employing ﬁrm at the time of naturalization. The gain
is substantial (about 14%). A similar eﬀect is found for women in high-skill occupations, of
even larger amplitude. Note that such large eﬀects are obtained by focusing on individuals most
likely to obtain a pay rise, which thus yields larger coeﬃcients than in overall estimates without
decomposition.
These results reveal the extent of heterogeneity in the wage eﬀects of citizenship, and the need
to account for this heterogeneity in measuring them. Diﬀerences across occupation groups appear
to be important in the citizenship eﬀect on wages, yet they are not taken into account in previous
studies. Neither is the link between the impact on mobility and wages accounted for. The results
here suggest that this may partly explain the small eﬀects measured in some cases (e.g. Scott
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(2008); Engdahl (2011)): if the impacts on wages and on employment mobility are tied together,
then measuring the wage eﬀect alone may fail to detect a signiﬁcant eﬀect.
These results suggest several potential mechanisms. The pattern for low-skilled occupations is
consistent with a mismatch between some foreign workers and their employment: the immediate
mobility response, in the naturalization year, suggests that foreign citizenship is what prevented
those workers from moving up to higher-qualiﬁed occupations before. This upward mobility is
associated with a wage gain, which is largely explained by the average wage levels of their initial and
ﬁnal occupations (so that including occupation ﬁxed-eﬀects makes the coeﬃcient non signiﬁcant).
The gains found for women in higher-skilled occupations suggests a second, distinct mechanism
by which foreign citizenship constrains mobility and wages. One possibility is that this pattern
could be due to barriers speciﬁc to some jobs - e.g., some of the public or private sector activities
restricted to nationals (see section 2). Other forms of discrimination may be at work.
22
Table 6: Naturalization and wages (Men, 1993-2001)
log hourly wage
Occupation group LSB LSW MS HS
Citizenship -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03
(0.65) (0.47) (0.76) (0.19)
R2 0.095 0.167 0.127 0.122
Ctz. x 0.02 0.08 -0.01 -0.10
occ. mobility (0.46) (0.01) (0.90) (0.18)
Ctz. x -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.05
no occ. mobility (0.76) (0.61) (0.61) (0.02)
R2 0.096 0.169 0.127 0.124
Ctz. x 0.02 0.08 -0.01 -0.10
occ. mobility (0.47) (0.01) (0.91) (0.18)
Ctz. x -0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.04
employer mobility (0.34) (0.43) (0.25) (0.33)
Ctz. x 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.05
no employer mobility (0.60) (0.89) (0.79) (0.02)
R2 0.096 0.169 0.128 0.124
occ. ﬁxed-eﬀects
Ctz. x -0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.05
occ. mobility (0.46) (0.33) (0.64) (0.45)
Ctz. x -0.02 -0.02 0.06 0.02
employer mobility (0.36) (0.47) (0.20) (0.61)
Ctz. x 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.04
no employer mobility (0.75) (0.90) (0.98) (0.05)
R2 0.104 0.214 0.149 0.142
Observations 63725 12860 8881 8824
p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at individual (worker) level.
Panel regressions with individual ﬁxed-eﬀects. Samples include all foreign and nat-
uralized foreign-born workers, by ﬁrst observed occupation group. Citizenship
equals 1 when a worker has French citizenship. Occ. mobility equals 1 for indi-
viduals changing occupation in the same year as naturalization. Employer mobility
equals 1 for individuals changing employer (ﬁrm) in the same year as naturalization,
without changing occupation. Model includes year ﬁxed-eﬀects, experience, tenure
and their squares. HS= High-skilled occupations, MS: middle-skilled, LSW/B: low-
skilled white/blue-collar occupations. See text for deﬁnitions of occupational cate-
gories.
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Table 7: Naturalization and wages (Women, 1993-2001)
log hourly wage
Occupation group LSB LSW MS HS
Citizenship 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.03
(0.61) (0.44) (0.05) (0.52)
R2 0.087 0.126 0.112 0.094
Ctz. x 0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.33
occ. mobility (0.86) (0.11) (0.89) (0.10)
Ctz. x 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.09
no occ. mobility (0.41) (0.60) (0.02) (0.04)
R2 0.087 0.126 0.113 0.102
Ctz. x 0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.33
occ. mobility (0.87) (0.11) (0.89) (0.10)
Ctz. x -0.03 0.02 0.16 0.28
employer mobility (0.35) (0.35) (0.05) (0.01)
Ctz. x 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.02
no employer mobility (0.05) (0.84) (0.13) (0.58)
R2 0.087 0.126 0.113 0.107
occ. ﬁxed-eﬀects
Ctz. x -0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.23
occ. mobility (0.62) (0.48) (0.58) (0.18)
Ctz. x -0.03 0.02 0.15 0.25
employer mobility (0.34) (0.35) (0.06) (0.01)
Ctz. x 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.00
no employer mobility (0.06) (0.95) (0.11) (0.96)
R2 0.097 0.139 0.131 0.129
Observations 18834 19459 4686 3022
p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at individual (worker) level.
Panel regressions with individual ﬁxed-eﬀects. Samples include all foreign and nat-
uralized foreign-born workers, by ﬁrst observed occupation group. Citizenship
equals 1 when a worker has French citizenship. Occ. mobility equals 1 for indi-
viduals changing occupation in the same year as naturalization. Employer mobility
equals 1 for individuals changing employer (ﬁrm) in the same year as naturalization,
without changing occupation. Model includes year ﬁxed-eﬀects, experience, tenure
and their squares. HS= High-skilled occupations, MS: middle-skilled, LSW/B: low-
skilled white/blue-collar occupations. See text for deﬁnitions of occupational cate-
gories.
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Robustness checks First, I test whether the measured eﬀect on wages actually follows natural-
ization, or precedes it. One would expect to ﬁnd an anticipated eﬀect, if for example, a decision
to settle permanently in the country and to assimilate leads to wage growth and, eventually, to
naturalization. Results on mobility, in the previous section, have already given an indication on
this, by showing that the increase in the propensity to change employment as mostly taking place
in the year of naturalization and not earlier. Since we found that the wage premium was tied to
mobility, it seems likely that the wage eﬀect should not precede naturalization either.
In table 8, I use the same model as before, testing whether a worker's hourly wage is higher
after s/he has naturalized; this variable Citizenship is interacted with an indicator for occupational
mobility (change in 1-digit occupation class) at the time of naturalization. In addition, I include
a variable Citizenship (t-3) which switches to one 3 years before naturalization. This variable is
similarly interacted with the same indicator of occupational mobility at the time of naturalization.
The previous results are mostly unaﬀected. As before, a signiﬁcant wage premium is found for
men in the low-skilled white-collar group, associated with occupational mobility; and for women
in the middle- and high-skilled groups, associated with no change of occupation. There is no sign
of these eﬀects starting before naturalization. 27
This is further conﬁrmed when one excludes all observations after naturalization has occurred
(keeping only workers when still foreign), which is done in the columns 5 to 8 of the table: there
is no sign of a signiﬁcant wage hike preceding naturalization.
Second, the issue of selection is addressed more broadly. In general one may suspect that
individuals who naturalize at some point have faster wage growth, for instance because they
accumulate more country-speciﬁc human capital, even before naturalization occurs. I test for this
in tables 9 and 10, where 3 models of increasing ﬂexibility are estimated. I ﬁrst add to the model
interaction terms of experience (and its square) with individual indicators for those individuals
who naturalize at some point (equal to constant 1 also before naturalization). Second, I add the
possibility that those who change occupation in the year of naturalization, have faster wage growth;
this is done by adding the interaction of experience with an indicator for individuals who changed
occupation in the year of naturalization 28. Finally, I allow for wage growth to diﬀer also after
naturalization (adding a term experience x post-naturalization x indicator for naturalization with
occupational change).
27Similar tests for an eﬀect 4, 2, 1 year before naturalization have been conducted and conﬁrm the results shown
here. They are available upon request.
28Thus, the dummy naturalized, equal to constant 1 for individuals who ever naturalize, is equal to the sum of the
two indicators naturalized with mobility and naturalized without mobility. The case without mobility is the omitted
category here.
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Results conﬁrm the robustness of the previous ﬁndings and clarify the patterns. For men in
low-skilled white-collar occupations, the last panel indicates that the wage premium is entirely
driven by faster wage growth after naturalization. Allowing for faster wage growth (along the
career) for those naturalizing does not aﬀect the coeﬃcient previously found (ﬁrst panel), but
adding the mobility distinction does29 (second panel).
Thus, for this category of workers, it appears that naturalization has a positive eﬀect on wages
mainly through occupation mobility, which delivers a gain in wages through faster wage growth.
For women in middle-skilled occupations, by contrast, results in the third panel indicate that
the premium previously found is essentially immediate, as it is captured by the citizenship variable
more than by post-naturalization eﬀects on wage growth. This eﬀect is robust to the alternative
speciﬁcations tested.30
Overall, these tests conﬁrm that the previous results on naturalization wage premia, are not
attributable to the selection of naturalization candidates, nor on patterns of assimilation or invest-
ment which could start before naturalization takes place.
29This seems to be due to the experience term capturing part of the post-naturalization wage growth acceleration.
30The speciﬁc eﬀect found for women suggests that the eﬀects of foreign citizenship may be compounded by other
factors, e.g. gender-based discrimination, or professional choices within couples; so as to make this eﬀect apparent
for women but not for men in similar occupations. Lack of information on e.g. family background in the data
prevents us from testing this.
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Table 8: Naturalization and wages: t vs. t− 3
log hourly wage
Occupation LSB LSW MS HS LSB LSW MS HS
before naturalization only
Men
Citizenship x 0.01 0.09 0.01 -0.08
occ. mobility (0.60) (0.01) (0.86) (0.28)
Ctz. x -0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.05
no occ. mobility (0.84) (0.41) (0.85) (0.03)
Citizenship (t-3) x 0.02 -0.05 -0.09 -0.09 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.08
occ. mobility (0.40) (0.09) (0.06) (0.31) (0.62) (0.73) (0.10) (0.34)
Ctz. (t-3) -0.00 0.03 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
no occ. mobility (0.77) (0.24) (0.27) (0.31) (0.63) (0.38) (0.39) (0.09)
Observations 63725 12860 8881 8824 57458 10915 6839 7405
R2 0.096 0.169 0.128 0.124 0.087 0.148 0.108 0.113
Women
Citizenship x 0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.33
occ. mobility (0.88) (0.09) (0.91) (0.10)
Ctz. x 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.09
no occ. mobility (0.47) (0.63) (0.01) (0.04)
Ctz. (t-3) x 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04
occ. mobility (0.82) (0.41) (0.53) (0.62) (0.85) (0.64) (0.44) (0.23)
Ctz (t-3) 0.01 -0.00 -0.07 0.02 -0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.04
no occ. mobility (0.57) (0.98) (0.06) (0.64) (0.93) (0.99) (0.50) (0.44)
Observations 18834 19459 4686 3022 16718 15484 3614 2556
R2 0.087 0.126 0.114 0.102 0.082 0.100 0.099 0.076
p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at individual (worker) level.
Panel regressions with individual ﬁxed-eﬀects. Samples include all foreign and naturalized foreign-
born workers, by ﬁrst observed occupation group. Citizenship equals 1 when a worker has French
citizenship, Citizenship (t-3) equals 1 starting three years before a worker acquires citizenship.
Columns 5-8: post-naturalization observations excluded.
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Table 9: Naturalization and wages: selection and wage dynamics - Men
log hourly wage
Occupation LSB LSW MS HS
Ctz. x occ. mobility 0.00 0.08 -0.01 -0.12
(0.93) (0.01) (0.90) (0.12)
Ctz. x empl. mobility -0.03 -0.02 0.06 0.03
(0.09) (0.52) (0.25) (0.55)
Ctz. x no empl. mobility -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.03
(0.69) (0.96) (0.81) (0.20)
(Expce. 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.00
x naturalized) (0.00) (0.47) (0.38) (0.86)
Ctz. x occ. mobility -0.02 0.05 0.03 -0.10
(0.53) (0.15) (0.60) (0.27)
Ctz. x no occ. mobility -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.03
(0.45) (0.72) (0.83) (0.24)
(Expce. 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.00
x naturalized) (0.00) (0.17) (0.38) (0.69)
(Expce. 0.01 0.02 -0.00 0.02
x nat'd w/ mobility) (0.61) (0.13) (0.89) (0.54)
Ctz. x -0.07 0.02 0.03 -0.11
occ. mobility (0.10) (0.60) (0.58) (0.31)
Ctz. -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.03
no mobility (0.47) (0.90) (0.79) (0.29)
(Expce. x 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01
naturalized) (0.23) (0.33) (0.83) (0.41)
(Expce. x 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
nat'd w/ mobility) (0.75) (0.98) (0.24) (0.52)
Post-nat expce. 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01
x mobility (0.01) (0.02) (0.92) (0.67)
Post-nat expce. -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
x no mobility (0.68) (0.68) (0.67) (0.71)
Observations 63725 12860 8881 8824
p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at individual
(worker) level.
Model as in table 6, adding interaction terms of experience,
experience2 with dummy indicators. Expce x naturalized: experi-
ence * dummy for individuals acquiring citizenship at some point.
(Expce x nat'd w/ mobility): experience * dummy for individuals
who naturalize with a change of occupation in the naturalization
year. Model also includes interactions of experience2 with natu-
ralized, nat'd w/ mobility. (Post-nat experience x mobility): years
since naturalization * dummy for occupational change in the nat-
uralization year.
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Table 10: Naturalization and wages: selection wand wage dynamics - Women
log hourly wage
Occupation LSB LSW MS HS
Ctz. x mobility 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.34
(0.63) (0.18) (0.75) (0.08)
Ctz. x -0.01 0.01 0.17 0.27
empl. mob (0.65) (0.55) (0.04) (0.01)
Ctz. x 0.04 -0.00 0.07 0.00
no empl. mob. (0.00) (0.74) (0.10) (0.98)
Expce x -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.00
naturalized (0.15) (0.34) (0.71) (0.97)
Ctz. x 0.05 0.02 -0.05 -0.25
occ. mobility (0.30) (0.55) (0.60) (0.17)
Ctz. x 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.05
no occ. mobility (0.28) (0.87) (0.00) (0.28)
Expce. x -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02
naturalized (0.44) (0.59) (0.66) (0.34)
Expce. x -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.10
mobility nat'd (0.20) (0.25) (0.93) (0.04)
Ctz. x 0.05 0.01 -0.06 -0.20
occ. mobility (0.34) (0.83) (0.53) (0.33)
Ctz. x 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.05
no occ. mobility (0.15) (0.93) (0.00) (0.29)
Expce. x -0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.01
nat'd (0.93) (0.67) (0.02) (0.40)
Expce. x -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01
mobility x nat'd (0.03) (0.60) (0.34) (0.55)
Post-nat expce x 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.05
mobility (0.70) (0.10) (0.35) (0.17)
Post-nat expce x -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
no mobility (0.30) (0.77) (0.26) (0.79)
Observations 18834 19459 4686 3022
p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at individual
(worker) level.
See table 9 for description of variables.
29
4.3 Comparing the wages of foreign-born and native workers
I now turn to speciﬁcations including natives. Do the wage gains from naturalization, found in the
previous section, reﬂect a catching-up of foreign wages to natives'? Does naturalization partly or
fully close the foreign-native wage gap? This is the question here.
I use the following speciﬁcation:
lnwit =
∑
o
αoForeignit.D
o
it +
∑
o
βoNatit.D
o
it +
∑
o
γoD
o
it + λ.Xit + it (4)
where Doit are indicator variables for the four categories of occupation: High-skilled, Medium-
skilled, and Low-skilled blue/white-collar. Foreignit indicates a foreign-born worker, and Natit a
naturalized worker (for whom Foreign is still one). Xit are controls, including age, experience,
tenure, and their squares.
Coeﬃcient αo measures the wage gap between foreign and native workers, in occupation o.
The wage level of naturalized workers, relative to natives, is given by αo + βo. Note that I cannot
use ﬁxed-eﬀects to control for individual heterogeneity anymore (as such heterogeneity would
encompass nationality). Thus, these measurements are inﬂuenced by selection, e.g. diﬀerences in
human capital, between foreigners and citizens.
Results are displayed in table 11.31 Wages of foreign (non naturalized) workers are signiﬁcantly
lower than those of natives, in most categories of work. Note that this can be attributable both to
selection eﬀects - e.g. lower levels of human capital of foreign workers - and/or to various forms of
discrimination.
Interestingly, naturalization is associated to little wage gains in Low-skilled occupations. This
is consistent with previous results in panel regressions, which indicated that the naturalization
premium, in these occupations, was obtained only by those workers who moved to diﬀerent types
of work.
By contrast, larger gains are associated to citizenship in Middle-skilled and High-skilled occu-
pations. This is most striking for women in middle- and High-skilled positions. These results are
consistent with those in the previous section, but may also be reﬂecting, to some extent, a selection
on talent in higher-skill positions.
31Note that the samples here contain only workers who are still present in the dataset after 2005. This allows to
exclude individuals observed with a EU nationality (this variable being available only after 2005).
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Table 11: Wages: foreign-born vs. natives (1993-2001)
log hourly wage
Men Women
Foreign-born x HS -0.046a -0.033a 0.003 -0.065a
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Naturalized x HS 0.071a 0.055a 0.142a 0.149a
(0.011) (0.010) (0.016) (0.015)
Foreign-born x MS -0.069a -0.054a -0.007 -0.048a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Naturalized x MS 0.040a 0.022b 0.023b 0.019c
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
Foreign-born x LSW -0.133a -0.094a -0.023a -0.040a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Naturalized x LSW 0.033a 0.002 0.011 -0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
Foreign-born x LSB -0.024a -0.066a -0.018a -0.032a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Naturalized x LSB -0.005 0.014b -0.003 0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011)
Fixed eﬀects Occupation, year
Firm f.e. yes yes
Observations 2206449 2206449 1848775 1848775
R2 0.449 0.342 0.310 0.218
Standard errors in parentheses
c p<0.1, b p<0.05, a p<0.01
HS: high-skilled, MS: low-skilled, LSW/B: low-skilled blue/white-collar.
See text for deﬁnition of occupational categories.
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5 Conclusion
This paper has studied the impact of naturalizations on the labor market outcomes of immigrants
in France. I use of a large, representative longitudinal database of employees in France over 1993-
2008, constructed from social security records, to study the impact of citizenship acquisitions on
job characteristics and on wages. The longitudinal dimension allows to disentangle causal impacts
of citizenship from selection eﬀects. I ﬁnd that naturalizations are associated to a large increase in
mobility: the probabilities to change occupations ; employing ﬁrm; contract type, and location, all
increase sharply in the year of the naturalization. The precise timing of events rule out alternative
explanations based on human capital accumulation. In addition, I ﬁnd, consistently with previous
studies, a substantial wage increase upon naturalization. The magnitude and conditions of this
wage increase vary across job types. Among men initially employed in low-skill occupations, there
is a wage increase conditional on occupational mobility. The premium is of the order of 8% in
permanent terms, and is driven by faster wage growth (of about 3% per year) after naturalization.
In addition, there is evidence of a premium for women in middle- and high-skilled occupations.
This eﬀect is larger (about 0.13%), immediate, and most pronounced for workers changing em-
ployer at the time of naturalization. These eﬀects are not explained by selection patterns, nor by
diﬀerences in wage trajectories before naturalization. Overall, there results conﬁrm that foreign
citizenship acts as a barrier to mobility on the labor market. They establish the link between such
barriers and the wage premium associated with naturalization. Several mechanisms could be at
work to create a mismatch between foreign workers and their job.
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